In a case of first impression, (M.R.& J.R. on behalf of E.R. v Ridley School District, No. 12-4137, 3d Cir. Feb 20, 2014) the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the stay-put provision of the IDEA applies through the end of the appeals process.
As a result, the Ridley School District was obliged to pay for nearly three years of private school tuition, despite decisions in its favor by the District and the Third Circuit Courts. Under the IDEA, when parents and a school district cannot agree on a child’s program or placement, the parties have the right to request a state administrative hearing and to seek state or federal court review of the administrative decision. The student has the right to remain in the student’s then-current educational placement during the pendency of the dispute resolution proceedings. The issue decided by the Third Circuit is the duration of that stay-put.
The Facts in the Case
In the Ridley case, the Court found that the hearing officer’s decision in favor of the parents’ placement established private school as pendency through final decision in the Third Circuit, notwithstanding the fact that the hearing officer’s decision was overturned by both the District and the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The School District argued that the pendency period extended only from the date of the hearing officer’s decision to the date of the District Court decision which overturned the hearing officer. Moreover, Ridley argued, the parents failed to seek payment while the private school was designated as the child’s pendent placement, and, therefore, they were not entitled to reimbursement.
The Court disagreed, reasoning, “Having been endorsed by the State [level hearing officer], the move to private school is no longer the parents’ unilateral action, and the child is entitled to ‘stay-put’ at the private school for the duration of the dispute resolution proceedings.”
The Third Circuit has not previously addressed whether the stay-put provision applies through the pendency of an IDEA dispute in the Court of Appeals. Previously, the Third Circuit held that the IDEA required a school district to pay for a private school that is the pendent placement through the date of a district court’s final order.
In Ridley, the Third Circuit opined that the statutory language of the IDEA and the “protective purposes” of the stay-put provision lead to the conclusion that Congress intended stay-put placement to remain in effect through the final resolution of the dispute. In so doing, the Third Circuit noted that the Circuit Courts which have addressed the issue are split. The 6th and the DC Circuits have held that pendency terminates at the District Court level; however, the Third Circuit sided with the 9th Circuit in its holding that pendency applies through final resolution of the dispute at the appellate level.
In the underlying matter, parents’ placement of their child in a private school was held to be appropriate by a hearing officer who in 2009 ordered the District to pay for the private school tuition for its failure to offer FAPE. The School District appealed and won before the District and the Third Circuit Courts, both of which overturned the hearing officer’s decision.
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit held that the School District remained obligated to pay tuition for the years intervening between the hearing officer’s decision in April 2009 and the resolution of the matter in the District’s favor before the Third Circuit in 2012. According to the Third Circuit, pendency attached at the time of the hearing officer’s decision in the parents’ favor and remained the stay-put placement until final resolution before that Court.
Thus, the parents of an elementary school child with specific learning disabilities recovered nearly three years’ worth of tuition at the Benchmark School from the Ridley School District despite the fact that both federal courts had sided with the School District and found that the public school’s proposed program and placement were appropriate.
The decision is, in the final analysis, one of cost shifting.
Third Circuit’s Conclusion
According to the Third Circuit, “[T]he rationale that underlies a school district’s obligation to finance a child’s pendent placement remains compelling through the appellate process. If we concluded that stay-put protection terminates while an appeal is pending, the parents of a child with disabilities would be faced with the untenable choice of removing their child from a setting the appeals court might find appropriate or risking the burden of private school costs they cannot afford for the period of the appeal.”
The Court concluded, “We are not insensitive to the financial burden our decision will impose on school districts or the seeming incongruity of the ultimately prevailing party having to pay for a now-rejected placement. Despite two judicial determinations that Ridley did not deny E.R. a FAPE, the school district will be assessed the cost of her private school education for a substantial amount of time. It is impossible, however, to protect a child’s educational status quo without sometimes taxing school districts for private education costs that ultimately will be deemed unnecessary by a court.”
The Court’s final word: “We see this not as ‘an absurd result,’ but as an unavoidable consequence of the balance Congress struck to ensure stability for a vulnerable group of children.”
School entities might disagree. School district resources are not infinite and such cost-shifting has potential consquences for other vulnerable children. Of course, the Third Circuit could have a double edge and benefit school districts who prevail at the due process hearing level.
The Bottom Line
Negotiate with parents under such circumstances to limit costs.
Continue to lobby for increased funding for public schools.
While the outcome in this case was hardly foreseeable, it is always best practice to consult with your solicitor to consider possible outcomes and costs.
School Law Bullets are a publication of the KingSpry Education Law Practice Group. John E. Freund, III, is our editor. The article is meant to be informational and does not constitute legal advice.
